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SYMPOSIUM 
IS THERE A PLACE FOR ISLAM IN THE WEST?  
ADJUDICATING THE MUSLIM HEADSCARF IN EUROPE 
AND THE UNITED STATES 
Andrea Pin* 
INTRODUCTION 
On March 14, 2017, while the world was debating whether the White House 
was trying to ban Islamic immigration in its executive orders,1 in the small town of 
Luxembourg fifteen judges spoke for the first time on Islam on behalf of the 
European Union.  The result was not particularly good for Muslims, especially 
compared with the relevant United States Supreme Court case law. 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) dealt with two cases that 
revolved around religious discrimination in the workplace.  Achbita v. G4S Secure 
Solutions2 originated in Belgium and concerned a company’s internal policies.  A 
Muslim receptionist had been dismissed because she refused to take off her religious 
veil, which was forbidden by her company’s internal rule that prohibited the use of 
visible religious, political, or philosophical signs.3  The French case Bougnaoui v. 
Micropole SA4 stemmed from the dismissal of an employee at a customer’s request.  
An engineer who called on clients for the company was fired because she refused to 
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 1 See, e.g., Farhana Khera & Johnathan Smith, Opinion, Don’t Be Fooled, Trump’s New 
Muslim Ban is Still Illegal, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/opinion/dont-be-fooled-trumps-new-muslim-ban-is-still-
illegal.html?mcubz=1; see also Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017); Exec. 
Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017). 
 2 Case C-157/15, Achbita v. G4S Secure Sols. NV, 2017 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 0157, 
¶ 11 (Mar. 14, 2017). 
 3 Id. ¶ 15–16. 
 4 Case C-188/15, Bougnaoui v. Micropole SA, 2017 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 0188, ¶ 14 
(Mar. 14, 2017). 
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take off her Muslim headscarf, as her company requested, after one of the company’s 
customers complained that being served on its own premises by someone wearing 
the headscarf had “upset a number of its employees.”5 
The CJEU was perfectly aware of the political importance of its rulings.  In 
Achbita, the Advocate General—a CJEU officer who advises the judging panel on 
how it should adjudicate in light of European Union (EU) interests6—had 
highlighted that the issue of the headscarf touched upon “the more fundamental 
question of how much difference and diversity an open and pluralistic European 
society must tolerate . . . and, conversely, how much assimilation it is permitted to 
require from certain minorities.”7  The CJEU’s judges knew that their decisions 
would measure the tensions that derived from “an arguably unprecedented influx of 
third-country migrants and the question of how best to integrate persons from a 
migrant background.”8 
The CJEU was informed about the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent case law on 
religious discrimination in the workplace: Achbita’s Advocate General explicitly 
mentioned the Court’s recent decision Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.9  In Abercrombie, a Muslim woman sued the 
clothing retailer for allegedly discriminating against her because it had decided not 
to hire her because of her religious expression.10  The plaintiff’s argument was that 
Abercrombie, which kept a strict dress code policy forbidding headgear, did not 
want to hire the woman for fear that she would seek an accommodation to wear the 
headscarf under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.11  The Supreme Court 
responded by making a clear statement in favor of religious freedom based on Title 
VII’s statutory language.  Although “[a]n employer [was] surely entitled to have . . . 
a no-headwear policy as an ordinary matter[,]” such policy did not rule out religious 
accommodations because “when an applicant requires an accommodation as an 
‘aspec[t] of religious . . . practice,’ it is no response that the subsequent ‘fail[ure] . . . 
to hire’ was due to an otherwise-neutral policy.”12 
This was not the conclusion of the CJEU, which utilized Achbita and 
Micropole to mark the distance between the European and the American approaches 
to religious discrimination in the workplace.  It made it crystal clear that Europe 
prioritizes economic activities over religious freedom and endorses neutrality as a 
plausible image for a company that can be forced upon employees, and it underlined 
 
 5 Id. 
 6 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 19, ¶ 2, Oct. 26, 2012, 
2012 O.J. (C 326/13) [hereinafter Treaty on European Union]. 
 7 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Case C-157/15, Achbita v. G4S Secure Sols. NV, 
2016 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 0157, ¶ 3 (May 31, 2016) [hereinafter Opinion of Advocate 
General]. 
 8 Id. ¶ 2. 
 9 See id. ¶ 110 n.59 (citing EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028 
(2015)). 
 10 Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2031. 
 11 Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012). 
 12 Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2034 (alterations in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 
2000e-2(a)(1)). 
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that the EU model of social compact largely differs from the United States’ 
traditional protection of freedom of religion. 
The judgments are unprecedented for the topics covered and are expected to 
have a long-lasting impact on religious accommodation throughout the twenty-eight 
countries that compose the European Union.  The importance of numerous rulings 
of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) on the Islamic headscarf13 is 
probably minuscule in comparison with these two judgments. 
Part I of this short Article explains the relevance of the Micropole and Achbita 
decisions; Part II explores the common line of reasoning behind them; and, finally, 
the conclusion analyzes their impact within the European scenario of religious 
freedom—especially for Muslims—and contrasts them with the United States’ 
approach to the topic. 
I.     THE ISLAMIC HEADSCARF AT THE CJEU: WHY IT IS SO IMPORTANT 
The CJEU had scarcely, if ever, addressed the issue of religious freedom before 
Achbita and Micropole.  This is not by accident.  The CJEU patrols EU law, which 
covers twenty-eight countries (twenty-seven after the completion of Brexit)14 and is 
the offspring of the three European Communities—the Economic one, that on Coal 
and Steel, and the one for Atomic Energy.  The European project was initially 
conceived as a form of legal integration that focused on economic issues and aimed 
at achieving peace for the whole continent while setting aside topics such as human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.15 
Surely, the European Union incorporated human rights into its core business 
in the 1990s and 2000s, in order to revitalize its fading legitimacy.16  The language 
of rights gained so much momentum that in 2000 the European Union enshrined 
them in its Charter of Fundamental Rights,17 which it later incorporated into its 
governing Treaty.18  This is why the European Union is now committed to the 
protection of religious freedom19 and even has a special envoy for religious freedom 
 
 13 See, e.g., Kocabaş v. Switzerland, App. No. 29086/12 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2017); S.A.S. v. 
France, App. No. 43835/11 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2014); Aktas v. France, App. No. 43563/08 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 2010); Bayrak v. France, App. No. 14308/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2009); Gamaleddyn v. France, 
App. No. 18527/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2009); Ghazal v. France, App. No. 29134/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
2009); Kervanci v. France, App. No. 31645/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2009); Dogru v. France, App. No. 
27058/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2008); Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2005); Dahlab 
v. Switzerland, App. No. 42393/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2001). 
 14 See The 28 Member Countries of the EU, EUROPEAN UNION, https://europa.eu/european-
union/about-eu/countries_en#28members (last visited Sept. 27, 2017). 
 15 See The History of the European Union, EUROPEAN UNION, https://europa.eu/european-
union/about-eu/history_en (last visited Oct. 9, 2017).  
 16 See J.H.H. Weiler, Deciphering the Political and Legal DNA of European Integration: An 
Exploratory Essay, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 137, 151 (Julie 
Dickson & Pavlos Eleftheriadis eds., 2012). 
 17 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000/C 364/1, 18 Dec. 2000 
[hereinafter Charter of Rights]. 
 18 Treaty on European Union, supra note 6, at art. 6, ¶ 1. 
 19 See Charter of Rights¸ supra note 16, art. 10. 
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outside the European Union, who advocates for this right through diplomatic 
efforts.20 
The European Union’s shift to encompass human rights has not expanded its 
powers, which remain mostly confined within the spectrum of economic activities.  
But the European Union has become committed to the protection of human rights—
including religious freedom—in the spheres in which it operates.  It is no surprise, 
therefore, that the two headscarf cases arose in the field of discrimination in the 
workplace. 
Put this way, religious freedom concerns still might seem peripheral to 
predominantly economic issues.  Make no mistake: the fact that the European Union 
addresses religious freedom topics within the economic sphere is both symbolically 
and legally relevant.  Symbolically, the European Union has constantly committed 
itself to a model of social market economy,21 according to which economic activities 
should function as proxies for social inclusion and for the enjoyment of human 
rights.  A conflict with Islam in the workplace is therefore a clash at the heart of the 
European Union’s political philosophy. 
Legally, the CJEU’s decisions are not like the older ECtHR judgments in the 
fields of religious freedom or Islam.  The latter court intervenes only after the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies and binds only the states that are involved in the 
proceedings.22  Even more importantly, the judgments create only an international 
obligation to comply with them.23  A state may disregard a judgment, as compliance 
is at its discretion and depends on the status it awards to the ECtHR’s decisions.24  
The ECtHR has ruled on French, Swiss, and Turkish bans of Islamic headscarves 
multiple times, and, admittedly, no claim of a religious freedom violation has ever 
succeeded within this field.25  But, had they lost, those states could still have ignored 
the judgments and kept their bans. 
European Union law is one of a kind.  It is good law within EU Member States.  
This means that its laws are immediately enforceable.26  Moreover, the CJEU often 
intervenes during domestic proceedings.27  As has happened in these two cases, a 
domestic court can request the CJEU to issue a judgment on the correct interpretation 
 
 20 Press Release, European Commission, President Juncker Appoints the First Special Envoy 
for the Promotion of Freedom of Religion or Belief Outside the European Union (May 6, 2016), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1670_en.htm. 
 21 See Lázló Andor, Emp’t, Soc. Affairs & Inclusion Comm’r, European Union, Building a 
Social Market Economy in the European Union (Oct. 20, 2011). 
 22 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art. 46, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 23 COURTNEY HILLEBRECHT, DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
TRIBUNALS: THE PROBLEM OF COMPLIANCE 3 (2014). 
 24 See id.  
 25 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 26 This has been solid doctrine since Case 26-62, N.V. Algemene Transp.- en Expeditie 
Onderneming van Gend v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Admin., 1963 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 
026 (Feb. 5, 1963). 
 27 See COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, ANNUAL REPORT 2014, 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2015-
04/en_ecj_annual_report_2014_pr1.pdf (summarizing cases in which Member States’ national 
courts requested the CJEU to interpret the validity of certain European laws).  
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of EU law that is relevant for the internal controversy at hand.  The CJEU’s rulings 
on the Muslim headscarf will function as binding precedents for not just the referring 
courts, but also for any other domestic court within the European Union, should a 
similar, new case arise within any of the Member States’ jurisdictions. 
In a few words, states can comply with the ECtHR’s rulings, while they have 
to comply with the CJEU’s ones.  This is why the CJEU has definitely set the stage 
for the next controversies as well as for more developments in the field. 
II.     THE DECISIONS AND THEIR BROADER RAMIFICATIONS 
Both Achbita and Micropole focused on the antidiscrimination directive, which 
is an EU regulation with binding effect on Member States.28  The directive prohibits 
discrimination on the ground of religion as well as on other grounds.29  It 
distinguishes, however, between two different types of discrimination.30  
Discrimination is “direct” “where one person is treated less favourably than another 
is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation;” it is “indirect” “where 
an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons having a 
particular religion or belief . . . at a particular disadvantage compared with other 
persons.”31  This latter kind of discrimination is permissible, however, if “justified 
by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and 
necessary.”32  Member States may permit different treatment where, “by reason of 
the nature of the particular occupational activities concerned or of the context in 
which they are carried out, such a characteristic constitutes a genuine and 
determining occupational requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and 
the requirement is proportionate.”33 
One judgment did not raise too many problems.  In Micropole, the French 
domestic court asked the CJEU a very specific question, namely whether a 
customer’s request that the employee take off her headscarf while she worked for 
her constituted a “genuine and determining occupational requirement.”34  This eased 
the CJEU’s work, as it promptly concluded that the directive’s allowance for 
different treatments did not cover “the wishes of a customer.”35  The company 
therefore had clearly discriminated against the Muslim employee on religious 
grounds. 
Achbita really made the difference.  At the start, the Belgian court made a 
request that was easy to handle: namely, whether the prohibition on the Muslim 
headscarf stemming from an internal, general ban on religious, political, or 
 
 28 See Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 Nov. 2000, 2000 O.J. (L 303/16) (by which the 
Council of the European Union “establish[ed] a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and education”). 
 29 Id. at ch. 1, art. 2. 
 30 Id. at ch. 1, art. 2, § 1. 
 31 Id. at ch. 1, art. 2, § 2(a), (b). 
 32 Id. at ch. 1, art. 2, § 2(b)(i). 
 33 Id. at ch. 1, art. 4, § 1. 
 34 Case C-188/15, Bougnaoui v. Micropole SA, 2017 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 0188, ¶¶ 19 
(Mar. 14, 2017). 
 35 Id. ¶¶ 40–41. 
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philosophical signs was direct discrimination.36  Such a general ban plainly shielded 
the company from charges of direct discrimination, and so concluded the CJEU.37 
But the CJEU went beyond the Belgian court’s request, answering more than 
it was asked.  The CJEU had already done such a thing in the past;38 but this time its 
deliberation had a different intonation and far more implications.  It spontaneously 
decided to provide the referring state with more guidance through inquiring whether 
the internal rule amounted to an indirect discrimination, and responded in the 
negative.39  This is the most troublesome part of Achbita, as it legitimized virtually 
any internal ban on visible religious signs. 
The CJEU found that a general ban could legitimately enforce a “private 
undertaking’s” policy of “neutrality.”40  “Neutrality” itself, in the CJEU’s reasoning, 
is an image that an employer may “wish to project . . . towards customers,” and 
“relates to the freedom to conduct a business” that the EU Charter enshrines among 
the freedoms it protects.41  The fact that such a policy of neutrality was fleshed out 
in an “internal rule” confirmed that it was “genuinely pursued in a consistent and 
systematic manner.”42 
The CJEU did not close the door to further scrutiny: it remembered that it was 
for the domestic judge to ascertain that the ban is concretely necessary and confined 
to workers who interact with customers before blessing it as legitimate.43  But, in 
principle, in the CJEU’s perspective a policy of neutrality is perfectly sound, within 
the scope of the freedom to conduct business, and even enforceable on the 
employees. 
The typically dry, formulaic, and extremely succinct style with which the 
CJEU’s judgment couched Achbita does not give full justice to the importance of 
this statement.  That the freedom of business always includes the freedom to enforce 
a strict policy of neutrality is, at least, questionable, as is the fact that Achbita 
expressly legitimizes only a policy of neutrality, without saying a word about other 
religious or philosophical options that a company may wish to embrace. 
Although a country like France cherishes neutrality as one of its core 
constitutional values, it is not uniformly accepted in many EU countries.  In fact, 
Europe has been debating about neutrality for at least ten years.44  The EU Treaty 
itself celebrates cultural diversity among and within states, but it took only seven 
 
 36 Case C-157/15, Achbita v. G4S Secure Sols. NV, 2017 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 0157, 
¶ 21 (Mar. 14, 2017). 
 37 Id. ¶ 32. 
 38 KATRIN NYMAN-METCALF & IOANNIS F. PAPAGEORGIOU, REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND 
COURTS OF JUSTICE 47 (2005) (“The ECJ [now the CJEU] has shown that it is prepared to 
reformulate questions or find in the questions asked what needs to be answered, rather than refuse 
to deal with the request.”).  For an example of such a usage of preliminary ruling, see C-44/79, 
Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz 1979 E.C.R. 3727. 
 39 See Achbita, 2017 EUR-Lex at ¶¶ 34–35. 
 40 Id. ¶¶ 22, 37. 
 41 Id. ¶ 38. 
 42 Id. ¶ 40. 
 43 Id. ¶ 42. 
 44 See generally Andrea Pin, Does Europe Need Neutrality? The Old Continent in Search of 
Identity, 2014 BYU L. REV. 605. 
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lines of Achbita45 for the CJEU to prioritize neutrality over religious freedom within 
private undertakings, while remaining silent on other options.  And this preference 
for neutrality is not without consequences for the states as well as for individuals.  
Hereafter, undertakings will be able to invoke the freedom to conduct business in 
order to enforce neutrality on their employees everywhere within the European 
Union. 
It is hard not to read Achbita’s line of reasoning as being driven by France and 
Belgium’s sensitivity about the Muslim headscarf: they were the first EU states to 
legislate against garments that conceal the face in the public square.46  Many details 
attest to this national influence on the decision.  First, the French government 
intervened in the proceedings warning that its constitutional secularism imposed 
some limitations on public servants,47 and that this would have been at risk had the 
CJEU ruled in favor of religious freedom. 
Second, Achbita intentionally confined its own reasoning about indirect 
discrimination to “private undertakings.”48  In so doing, it left the door open to more 
limitations on religious signs in the context of public services, such as to also target 
employees who are not exposed to the general public.  In other words, Achbita 
provided more types of headscarf bans with a subtle, indirect, but general 
legitimization. 
Finally, the CJEU went all the way by also legitimizing the prohibition on the 
slightest visible sign of religious belief.  Even the French approach to neutrality is 
more nuanced and varies from one context to the other: France forbids only the 
headscarf that hides the face completely in the public square;49 it bans any visible 
sign of belief only among public officers;50 in public schools, it targets only 
conspicuous signs, which need to be more than simply visible.51  Achbita 
rudimentarily legitimizes the prohibition of religious signs that are merely “visible,” 
namely the strictest version of French neutrality. 
By moving beyond the Belgian court’s inquiry about direct discrimination, 
legitimizing a business policy of neutrality, and justifying religious bans in the 
 
 45 See Achbita, 2017 EUR-Lex at ¶¶ 37–38. 
 46 See S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, ¶ 40 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2014). 
 47 Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 7, ¶ 31. 
 48 See Achbita, 2017 EUR-Lex at ¶¶ 34–35. 
 49 Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace 
public [Law 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010 Prohibiting the Concealment of the Face in the Public 
Space], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
FRANCE], Oct. 12, 2010, p. 18344. 
 50 See Céline Ruet, Interdiction du Port de Signes Religieux par les Agents du Service Public: 
La Combinatoire Subtile de L’arrêt Ebrahimian [Prohibition of the Wearing of Religious Symbols 
by Public Officials: The Subtle Combination of the Ebrahimian Judgment], 2016 LA REVUE DES 
DROITS DE L’HOMME 1, 1, https://revdh.revues.org/2516. 
 51 Loi 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de 
signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, colléges et lycées 
publics [Law 2004-228 of March 15, 2004 Framing, in Application of the  
Principal of Secularity, the Wearing of Signs or Outfits Displaying a Religious Affiliation in Public 
Schools, Colleges and Lycées], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 17, 2004, p. 5190. 
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workplace, the CJEU gave a favor to the most rigid political philosophy of 
secularism. 
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Supreme Court is normally reluctant to look into foreign law for 
inspiration while adjudicating.52  Conversely, the CJEU is accustomed to looking 
into U.S. case law for advice when it has to deal with unprecedented, difficult 
controversies.53 
This time, Achbita intentionally decided not to follow the U.S. approach.  The 
Advocate General clarified that in the United States “the employer has an obligation 
to provide ‘religious accommodation.’”54  But the Advocate thought that the EU 
position was to be “different,”55 and for a quintessentially economic reason: “[T]he 
search for alternative forms of deployment for each individual employee itself 
[would have] place[d] on the employer a substantial additional organisational burden 
with which not every undertaking [could] necessarily cope.”56 
It is especially hard to follow the Advocate General’s reasoning, given the size 
of G4S, the company for which Achbita worked, and the types of scrutiny under 
which CJEU normally operates.  G4S is a global operator with more than 600,000 
employees,57 and the CJEU has consistently promoted an in concreto approach in its 
case law by urging domestic courts to evaluate whether a measure that impinges 
upon other EU interests is really proportionate to the aim.58  The Advocate General 
could have suggested that undertakings such as the G4S or even those much smaller 
in size may allow for religious accommodations, and that the CJEU had to consider 
this aspect thoroughly.  On the contrary, the Advocate maintained that 
accommodation is economically expensive, and the CJEU’s reasoning followed that 
approach rather closely.  Achbita used very few words to flag the possibility that an 
employee may be reassigned to a position that would not affect an undertaking’s 
policy of neutrality.  It considered religious accommodation more as an 
extraordinary exception than the norm. 
Achbita married the freedom of economic initiative with the legitimization of 
a policy of neutrality, almost ruling out religious accommodations from the 
economic scenario.  With its dry, quasi-oracular phrasing, Achbita has widened the 
 
 52 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622–28 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the majority’s reference to foreign law in determining whether it is constitutional to 
impose the death penalty on offenders who were minors when their crimes were committed). 
 53 See, e.g., Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, Case C-438/05, Int’l Transp. 
Workers’ Fed’n v. Viking Line ABP, 2007 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS I-10806, ¶ 39 n.38 (Dec. 11, 
2007) (drawing from the relevant Supreme Court decisions when reflecting on whether the freedom 
of establishment within the EU was enforceable also against private parties and not only states). 
 54 Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 7, ¶ 110 n.59 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 
(2012)). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. ¶ 110. 
 57 See Scott DeCarlo, The World’s 10 Largest Employers, FORTUNE (Nov. 12, 2014), 
http://fortune.com/2014/11/12/worlds-largest-employers/. 
 58 See e.g., Case C-491/01, The Queen v. Sec’y of State for Health ex parte British Am. 
Tobacco (Investments) Ltd., 2002 E.C.R. I-11550.   
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European Union’s gap with the United States,59 embraced the French approach, and 
ultimately stricken a blow to the possibility of integrating Islam in the field where 
most social relationships start, deepen, and broaden: the workplace. 
 
 
 59 On the rising Islamophobia in the United States, however, see generally Khaled A. 
Beydoun, Islamophobia: Toward a Legal Definition and Framework, 116 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 
108 (2016), http://columbialawreview.org/content/islamophobia-toward-a-legal-definition-and-
framework/. 
